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Abstract We analyze the implications of the closure of the physical for
experiments in the scientific study of consciousness when all the details are
considered, especially how measurement results relate to physical events. It
turns out that the closure of the physical implies that no experiment can
distinguish between two theories of consciousness that obey this assumption.
Therefore, the closure of the physical is incompatible with scientific practice.
This conclusion points to a fundamental flaw in the paradigm underlying most
of the experiments conducted to date.
1. Introduction
The closure of the physical is a central assumption in the philosophy of mind and in
the scientific study of consciousness [12, 17]. It underlies both functionalist and identity
theories of consciousness and is a central component of many, if not all, neuroscientific
models of consciousness. However, we will show below that the closure of the physical
is untenable in a scientific context because it implies that no experiment can actually
distinguish between two theories of consciousness that obey this assumption. It is
therefore incompatible with scientific practice and hence unscientific.
The central idea of our argument is the observation that in any scientific experiment
the measurement results must be stored or transmitted before analysis, and we show
that this means that the stored data are determined by the physical properties of a
storage device or a transmission channel. In conjunction with the closure of the phys-
ical, this means that the stored data are independent of which theory of consciousness
is true.
It has already been pointed out that the closure of the physical is a problematic
assumption in a scientific context. [18] and [19], for example, make this point with
respect to property dualism and qualia epiphenomenalism. Our proof presented below
covers the general case. It shows independently of any other metaphysical premises
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that one of the central assumptions in the empirical study of consciousness is flawed.
This calls into question the theoretical basis of a large number of experiments con-
ducted to date and shows that the hope of basing a functionalist or identity-based
understanding of consciousness on empirical observations is null and void.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 elaborates which
theories of consciousness our argument addresses and defines an epistemic version of
the closure of the physical. Section 3 identifies a necessary condition for theories of
consciousness to be distinguished by empirical data. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the role
of empirical data in the scientific study of consciousness and why they supervene on
physical events. Section 6 is devoted to the proof of our main claim, and Section 7
shows that the causal closure of the physical, as usually defined ontologically, implies
our definition, which ensures that our result holds in full generality. Finally, Section 8
contains some concluding remarks.
2. Theories of consciousness
We use the term theories of consciousness to refer to the theories that are tested,
compared, or derived in experiments in the scientific study of consciousness, regard-
less of what metaphysical status of consciousness they presuppose. This includes, for
example, Integrated Information Theory [16], Global Neuronal Workspace Theory [14]
or Higher Order Thought Theory [1], and in general all scientific theories which adhere
to functionalism, identity theory or epiphenomenalism. This also includes illusionist
or eliminativist theories that are subject to experimental testing, even though they do
not grant consciousness an independent ontological status, but merely aim to explain
why someone has the illusion of being conscious [21].
Our results rely on two general facts about theories of consciousness. The first is that
theories of consciousness have some commitment with respect to physical events, where
physical events are the kinds of events that are the subject of natural sciences such as
biology, chemistry, neuroscience, and physics. Some theories modify the description of
physical events provided by natural science, for example, by postulating changes in the
temporal evolution of physical states, as recently in [3], others simply adopt whatever
natural science says about physical events without any modification.
The causal closure of the physical is the assumption that for every physical effect,
there is a sufficient physical cause. Its key epistemic repercussion (cf. Section 7) is
that theories of consciousness must not amend whatever it is that the physical sciences
say or imply about physical events. We call this epistemic assumption closure of the
physical : A theory of consciousness obeys the closure of the physical if and only if it
does not posit any changes to the physical events explained, predicted or otherwise
determined by natural science.
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This premise can be expressed concisely in formal terms. To this end, we introduce
two sets1 of event-descriptions. First, for any theory of consciousness T , we denote
by PT the physical events which T is committed to, for example the firing of some
neurons or the instantiation of some functional property. Every element in PT is a
description of an event that occurs, according to T , in the actual world. The description
specifies the event and may include properties or relational information about the
event. What exactly a description contains and in which language it is formulated is
not of importance here.
Second, we denote by PP the physical events which natural science explains, predicts
or determines. Whatever it is that natural science says or implies about the physical
events in the actual world is part of the class PP . Each element is in turn a description
of an event, including its properties and relations, and we allow that the description
is either deterministic or indeterministic.
Since scientific theories are complex, PP may not be known or even knowable. And
as science progresses over time, PP is likely to change over time. For this reason, in
what follows, PP functions like a variable. It is not important what value this variable
actually takes, but only what relationship a theory of consciousness has to this variable.
A theory of consciousness obeys the closure of the physical only if it does not pos-
tulate any changes to the class PP . Thus, it does not replace, change, or add to the
description of physical events explained, predicted, or otherwise determined by nat-
ural science. This means that for every physical event in PT to which a theory of
consciousness is committed, there is an element of PP that provides a description of
that event in one of the languages of a natural science. The descriptions in the two
sets may differ in language, but not in content.
In formal terms, this means that there is an embedding of PT into PP , i.e. an
injective (one-to-one) function ι of the form
ι : PT −→ PP , (1)
which specifies for every physical event and description that the theory of conscious-
ness is committed to the corresponding event and description explained, predicted, or
determined by natural science. The existence of this function is the concise meaning
of the closure of the physical introduced above: A theory of consciousness T obeys the
closure of the physical if and only if there exists a function ι as in (1). We will show in
Section 7 that the usual reading of the causal closure of the physical implies just that.
3. Experiments
In the scientific study of consciousness, experiments are conducted to falsify, con-
firm, or distinguish between competing theories of consciousness. The most important
1Note that we do not distinguish between classes and sets in this paper.
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component of any experiment is measurement, i.e., laboratory operations that produce
a set of data which constitutes the result of the measurement.
The second general fact on which our argument is based is that scientific theories of
consciousness have something to say about possible measurement results. We assume
that any theory allows one to derive, for some experiments and under appropriate
auxiliary assumptions, a class of data sets which, according to the theory, may occur
as the result of the experiment. This requirement singles out scientific theories as
those to which our argument applies.
We use the symbol M to represent an experiment, and furthermore introduce the
symbol OM to denote all data sets which could result from this experiment according
to some assumption or theory. So OM denotes the possible measurement results of M
in some context. If an experiment M only made measurements on one system and
everything were deterministic, then there would only be one data set in OM. But
experiments usually consider many systems and things are not deterministic, which is
why we have a whole class of data sets that can occur in M.
Given an experiment M to which a theory T can be applied, we denote the data sets
which can occur in M according T by OT . In experimental practice, OT is deduced
from T , making use of approximations and auxiliary assumptions, so that it contains
the pre- or retrodictions of T . But in our case we stick to the precise meaning inde-
pendently of approximations and auxiliary assumptions. Any result o ∈ OT can occur
in experiment M after T , and any o 6∈ OT cannot occur in M after T . If o ∈ OT occurs,
then the probability of T increases (and T is confirmed), and if o 6∈ OT occurs, then
the probability of T decreases (and T is disconfirmed). In a Popperian framework,
the occurrence of o ∈ OT provides a corraboration of T and the occurrence of o 6∈ OT
amounts to a falsification of T .
What matters for our purposes is that if two theories provide the exact same in-
formation about which results may or may not occur in an experiment, then these
theories cannot be distinguished in that experiment. Theories for which this is the
case are empirically indistinguishable. Put concisely in terms of the notation we have
just introduced, two theories T and T ′ are empirically indistinguishable if there is no
single experiment M such that OT 6= OT ′ in M.So if two theories are to be empirically
distinguishable, they cannot yield exactly the same class of possible measurement re-
sults for each experiment. There must be at least one experiment in which OT 6= OT ′ ,
so that in this experiment there is at least a chance that a result o occurs which lies in
one but not in both classes and is thus consistent with one but not with both theories.2
2Note that empirical indistinguishability is weaker than empirical equivalence, as defined, for example,
in [24] and [25]. Two theories are empirically indistinguishable if they make exactly the same testable
statements about experiments to which they are both applicable. Empirical equivalence also requires
that the two theories apply to exactly the same experiments.
5
It is natural to expect that a large number of experiments will not be able to
distinguish between two arbitrary theories, since experiments are usually designed
with specific theories in mind. Empirical indistinguishability holds only if for two
theories there is no experiment at all that can distinguish between them.
If an assumption implies that this is in fact true of all theories obeying this assump-
tion, and if there are two or more competing theories which do so, this is obviously
problematic. In case such an assumption is implied, all experiments that seek to dis-
tinguish between theories become meaningless, and all subsequent differences between
theories obeying that assumption untestable. This is incompatible with any empiri-
cally based scientific practice, so we consider this a sufficient condition to call such
an assumption unscientific. So if an assumption implies that any two different theo-
ries obeying that assumption are empirically indistinguishable, we conclude that this
assumption is unscientific.
We emphasize that this condition is a decidedly weak sufficient condition for a par-
ticular assumption not to be scientific. We have by no means proposed a new solution
to the notorious demarcation problem. Moreover, the condition is independent of the
choice of the preferred account of theory testing. An assumption that is unscientific
in this sense undermines any empirical scientific progress in the field in question.
Experiments in the scientific study of consciousness usually use two different types of
measurements [2]. First, they make use of what are called third-person measurements
which employ standard scientific methods. Typical examples are EEG or fMRI record-
ings. Second, they use what might be called first-person or consciousness-inferring
measurements. This class of measurements has been characterized as using the sub-
ject’s access to his or her own conscious experience in some way, such as via verbal
reports or pressing of a button [15]. More recently, the term subjective measures of
consciousness has come to refer to these types of measures [10], in contrast to objective
measures and no-report paradigms [23], which infer a subject’s state of consciousness
indirectly, e.g., by evaluating forced choice tasks [4] or behavioral data such as optoki-
netic nystagmus and the pupillary reflex [7].
What exactly the difference is between measurements in the first and third person
is not important for our purposes. The only important thing is that both types of
measurements produce results that need to be analyzed, interpreted or transformed.
To do this, they must be stored on a data repository. This fact has implications that
we analyze below.
4. Data
We have minimally characterized measurements as laboratory operations that pro-
vide a data set that is designated as the result of the experiment. But what does it
mean that this data set must be stored on some device? To address this question, let’s
take a hard disk as an example. A hard disk stores data by magnetizing a thin film
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of ferromagnetic material that forms the surface of the hard disk platter. The film is
made up of many tiny, sequentially aligned magnetic regions, each of which has a mag-
netization vector that can point in one of two directions. When data is stored on the
disk, the head of the drive arm moves over these areas and changes the magnetization
vector by applying electric fields. When reading data from the disk, the actuator arm
uses weaker electric fields to sense the magnetization vectors of the areas.
The data stored on the disk is the distribution of magnetization vectors across the
magnetic areas in terms of the order of the areas. Two copies of the same disk cannot
differ in the data stored on it without differing in at least some magnetization vectors.
The data is determined by the magnetization vectors.
The crucial thing about the magnetization vectors that determine the data stored
on a hard disk is that they are not just properties of the device, but actually physical
properties of the device, the kind of properties that are the subject of natural science, in
this case electromagnetism. Electromagnetism explains their causal properties, such
as how the magnetization vector responds to electric fields, and also their dynamic
properties, such as how magnetization vectors change over time without interactions.
Accordingly, the occurrence of a particular distribution of magnetization vectors
over the ferromagnetic film at a particular time is a physical event, the kind of event
that is the subject of natural science. It follows that the data stored on the hard disk is
determined by a physical event: in this case, the distribution of magnetization vectors
over the ferromagnetic film. There is no constraint on why or how this physical event
occurs, but once the event occurs, the data stored on the hard disk is determined.
This is true not only for hard drives, but for all data storage devices, such as solid-
state drives or flash drives, where the relevant semiconductor properties can only be
explained using condensed matter theory and quantum mechanics. But even when
data is stored on something as simple as a piece of paper or a spoken word, the data
supervene on physical events, namely the distribution of ink molecules on the paper
material and air pressure fluctuations, which in these cases represent sound waves.
We can again express this fact succinctly in formal terms. Functions in the mathe-
matical sense of the word are defined to capture exactly those cases where something
is completely determined by something else. Let us denote by P the set or class of
all physical events (and descriptions) that can possibly occur in the real world, and
by OD all records that can possibly be stored on a storage device D. The notion of
possibility at issue here is logical possibility. The physical events explained, predicted,
or determined by natural science for the actual world form a subset of P, the subset PP
we introduced above. The same is true for the physical events PT to which a theory
of consciousness is committed.
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The fact that the physical events which occur in the actual world determine the
data that is stored on a storage device D can then be represented by a function
dD : P (P) −→ P (OD) , (2)
where P (P) is the set of all subsets of P, called the power set of P, and where P (OD)
is the power set of OD. The function dD provides for every logically possible set of
physical events P ⊂ P of the actual world a class of data sets OD ⊂ OD that could be
stored on D at a particular time, so it maps element-wise as
dD : P 7−→ OD . (3)
It selects from all physical events which, according to P, are part of the real world those
which are relevant for data storage on the device D, e.g. the magnetization vectors in
the case of a hard disk. Since P may contain indeterministic statements, the output
of the function may also be indeterministic. For this reason, the output is represented
by a class OD, which may contain more than one record o. However, although OD is
consistent with indeterminism in physical events, it is completely determined by PP .
This is enforced by the fact that dD is a function. If D is not instantiated in a set P,
the function simply returns the empty set.
In order to use this function in the following, we have to consider two conditions. The
first condition arises from the fact that the data stored on a device D corresponding
to some physical events is independent of the language used to describe those events.










The content of ι(PT ) and PT is the same, so also the data stored on D.
The second condition targets situations where one set of physical events completely
contains another, e.g. when the latter is a partial description of the former. A set of
physical events P2 completely contains another set P1 if all event descriptions of P1
are also contained in P2, which means that P2 describes exactly the same events as
P1. It may add to the description of P1, but it does not change it in any way. Thus,
if P1 includes all the physical events required to instantiate a data repository D, and
thus determines the data stored on D, it follows that P2 also includes these events, so
that the data that P1 and P2 determine to be stored on D are the same. Whenever











We are now ready to apply this result on data storage to experiments in the scientific
study of consciousness. The measurements performed in these experiments tend to be
quite complex. They may employ advanced brain imaging techniques such as EEG,
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ECoG, or fMRI, and require finely tuned equipment and sophisticated analysis to learn
about a subject’s state of consciousness.
In the case of EEG, ECoG or fMRI recordings, it is relatively clear what the result
of such measurements is. It is the data set that the scanner provides after each trial
and that is stored in computer memory. In the case of subjective measures, one would
normally expect reports or keystrokes to count as results; in the case of objective
measures, changes in pupil size and the like. Crucially, however, all of these are
physical events. The electrical activity that an EEG electrode measures is as much
a physical event as the sound waves that make up a spoken word or the mechanical
movements of a button.
Our analysis from the last section allows us to make this point despite the termino-
logical ambiguities about what to count as the result of a measurement. A necessary
condition for a record to count as the result of a measurement is that it be stored
somewhere. This can be computer memory, but it can also be something simpler like
ink on paper or density fluctuations in sound waves. Even data transmission, such as
in a cable attached to a button that a person presses, is a form of data storage, albeit
of very short duration. So for something to be considered a measurement at all, there
must necessarily be a data repository D, so that some of the data stored on D is the
result of the measurement.
However, we have established above that the data stored on a device D is determined
by physical events. Since a part of this data represents the measurement result, the
measurement results are also determined by physical events. How these physical events
come about – what their causes are – is not constrained by our analysis. The events
can have purely physical causes, physical and non-physical causes, or a priori only
non-physical causes. Which of these cases applies and with respect to which notion of
causality depends on the theory of consciousness.
As before, let us denote by M an arbitrary but fixed experiment in the scientific
study of consciousness, and let us denote by D the data store or stores necessarily
used in M to store the results of the measurement. We have already introduced the
symbol OM to denote the data sets that, under certain assumptions or theories, could
be the possible outcomes of the experiment M. Our analysis from the previous section
then shows that OM is also determined by the function dD introduced in (2), namely
by restricting dD to the part of the data stored on D that represents the measurement
results. If we denote this restriction by dM and all data sets that could possibly result
from M by OM, we obtain a function
dM : P (P) −→ P (OM)
P 7−→ OM ,
(6)
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which maps any set of physical events P, which could possibly represent the physical
events of the actual world, to the measurement results, which in this case would be
determined as the result of the experiment M.
The function dM establishes a connection between what a theory of consciousness T
predicts or postulates about physical events in the real world, on the one hand, and the
possible measurement outcomes that can occur according to T , on the other. It selects
from the events PT that the theory T is committed to those events which determine
the data that is stored on D. Making use of the symbol OT introduced above to denote
the possible measurement results that can occur in M after T , this means that
dM(PT ) = OT . (7)
In this way, we can determine OT independently of approximations or auxiliary as-
sumptions.
6. Why the closure of the physical is unscientific
By considering that measurement results must be stored and are thereby determined
by physical events, we have obtained a novel, additional handle for analyzing experi-
ments in the scientific study of consciousness. In addition to what experimenters derive
from a theory T and appropriate auxiliary assumptions, we can now analyze measure-
ment results along the path of what a theory of consciousness says about physical
events. This gives rise to the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The closure of the physical is unscientific.
Proof. Let T1 and T2 denote two theories of consciousness which obey the closure of the
physical. This implies that there exist embeddings ι1 : PT1 −→ PP and ι2 : PT2 −→ PP
as in (1). Let M denote an experiment to which both T1 and T2 are applicable, and D
the data storage device(s) used in that experiment. Because of condition (4), we have
dD(ι1(PT1)) = dD(PT1) and dD(ι2(PT2)) = dD(PT2).
Both T1 and T2 need to be committed to the existence of physical events which
instantiate the data storage device D used in M, for otherwise they would violate the
very conditions that make M possible. Therefore, D is instantiated in both PT1 and
PT2 . Because applying ι1 resp. ι2 does not change the content of the described events,
it follows that D is also instantiated ι1(PT1), resp. ι2(PT2).
Because ι1 is an embedding, we have ι1(PT1) ⊂ PP . Because D is instantiated in
ι1(PT1), Equation (5) applies so that we have dD(ι1(PT1)) = dD(PP ). The same applies
to ι2, so that also here, Equation (5) implies dD(ι2(PT2)) = dD(PP ). So we in fact have
dD(ι1(PT1)) = dD(ι2(PT2)), which in light of the above implies dD(PT1) = dD(PT2).
We thus find that the data stored on D is exactly the same for both theories.
Restriction to dM introduced in (6) furthermore implies that dM(PT1) = dM(PT2), and
because of (7), this implies that OT1 = OT2 . So the measurement results of M are
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exactly the same according to both T1 and T2. Independently of which predictions one
arrives at by making use of auxiliary assumptions, the closure of the physical implies
that the data sets which can occur in M cannot differ.
Since M was chosen arbitrarily, this conclusion holds for any experiment M, so
T1 and T2 are empirically indistinguishable. And because T1 and T2 were arbitrarily
chosen among the theories obeying the closure of the physical, we can conclude that
all theories obeying the closure of the physical are empirically indistinguishable. It
follows that the closure of the physical is an assumption that is unscientific. 
7. Causal closure of the physical
The causal closure of the physical is the assumption that for every physical effect
there is a sufficient physical cause. This is an ontological assumption; it refers to what
is the case in the actual world. In contrast, the assumption we have been working with
above – that a theory of consciousness obeys the closure of the physical if and only
if it does not postulate changes in physical events explained, predicted, or otherwise
determined by natural science – is epistemic in nature, it depends on the definition,
formulation, and content of a theory of consciousness.
The precise meaning of the causal closure of the physical depends heavily on what
notion of causality one subsumes, what ontology one grants to causality (if any), and
what one allows as relata of the causal relation. Nevertheless, there is a great deal of
consensus about what epistemic implications this assumption has.
According to Jaegwon Kim, for example, the causal closure of the physical implies
that “to explain the occurrence of a physical event we never need to go outside of the
physical realm” [12, p. 147]. And Frank Jackson characterizes the causal closure of the
physical as the claim that “the physical sciences, or rather some natural extension of
them, can in principle give a complete explanation for each and every bodily movement,
or at least can do so up to whatever completeness is compatible with indeterminism
in physics” [11, p. 378].
These statements exemplify that the causal closure of the physical is generally taken
to imply that every physical event which is explained at all, is explainable by natural
science. But explanation, precisely construed [22], is only one way in which a theory
can address events. Making room for prediction and other possible ways as well, we
may take the causal closure of the physical to imply that every physical event which is
predicted, explained, or determined at all, can be predicted, explained, or determined
by natural science.
Applied to a theory of consciousness, this means that any physical event that the
theory explains, predicts, or determines can eventually be explained, predicted, or
determined by natural science. But for this to be true, the theory must not replace,
alter, or add to the natural science account of physical events, because otherwise it
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would be committing itself to physical events that cannot be explained, predicted, or
determined by natural science. Thus, the causal closure of the physical implies that a
theory of consciousness cannot make changes to the physical events that are explained,
predicted, or determined by natural science.
This point can also be stated in formal terms. We have denoted the set of physical
events that a theory of consciousness is committed to by PT . These are the events
explained, predicted, or otherwise determined by that theory. And we have denoted
the set of physical events explained, predicted, or otherwise determined by natural
science (now or in the future) by PP . Thus, if every physical event that can be
explained, predicted, or determined at all can be explained, predicted, or determined
by natural science, then every event that is in PT is also in PP . Taking into account
the different languages that can be used in the two cases, this means that for every
event description in PT there is a corresponding event description of the same event
in PP . This constitutes an injective function that maps PT to PP .
We thus arrive at exactly the same formal requirement as in Equation (1). The
causal closure of the physical implies that there is an embedding ι : PT → PP that
specifies for each physical event and physical description that the theory of conscious-
ness is bound to the corresponding event and description explained, predicted, or
determined by natural science. Causal closure of the physical implies closure of the
physical, and as a corollary of Theorem 1 we posit that causal closure of the physical
is also unscientific.
We emphasize that nowhere in our argument do we restrict to physical events which
are already explained or predicted by natural science. What matters is only which
relation a theory of consciousness proposes between the physical events it is committed
to and the physical events that natural science posits. Even if a theory presupposes
that the physical events it associates with conscious experiences are determined by
physical laws, but cannot in practice be explained or predicted based on these laws,
as some emergentist theories would have it, our argument applies. Theories of this
sort may be wrong about what they say about physical events, and experiments may
help to determine whether this is the case, but insofar as they buy into the very same
underlying account of physical events as all other theories, the measurement results
necessarily are the same as if any other theory were true.
8. Conclusion
We have shown that the causal closure of the physical goes far beyond what is usu-
ally considered. Since all measurement results in the scientific study of consciousness
are either physical events (such as keystrokes or sound waves) or at least determined
by physical events (such as data stored on hard disks), no two theories obeying the
causal closure of the physical can actually be distinguished in experiments. Our result
applies to all major neuroscientific theories of consciousness as well as to the leading
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philosophical paradigms in the field. It applies to any theory of consciousness that fits
into the natural science account of physical events without altering it. This includes
all functionalist and identity theories of consciousness, such as GNW [14], HOT [1],
AST [8], or predictive processing-based theories [20], as well as eliminativist or illu-
sionist theories [6]. But it also includes theories such as IIT, whose mathematics takes
the form of a function that maps physical states and events to conscious states and
events [13].
We have shown that no experiment of any kind can actually distinguish between
these theories. Whatever measurement result is consistent with one theory is neces-
sarily consistent with the other, because the physical functioning of the brain, from
stimulus presentation to verbal message or similar output, is exactly the same accord-
ing to all these theories. This observation is at odds with the numerous experiments
conducted to date to distinguish precisely between some of these theories. Our results
show that there is a major flaw underlying all of these experiments. The theories on
which these experiments are based violate a necessary condition for the experiments
to work as intended.
At best, we can conclude that experimenters do not really adhere to the closure of
the physical when conducting experiments, so they implicitly assume that the theories
tested modify what falls solely within the realm of natural science. At worst, our results
call into question the conclusions drawn on the basis of these experimental results. In
either case, our results show that the closure of the physical must be abandoned in
both theory and experiment. Theories of consciousness must explicitly state how what
they take to be consciousness (physical or otherwise) comes to determine reports and
other measures of consciousness, and to do this they must enter the realm of natural
science.
In a very different context, Einstein once asserted that “[it] is the theory which
decides what we can observe” [5, 9]. It seems that this point has not yet been fully
recognized in the construction of scientific theories of consciousness.
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